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Abstract
Background. Impaired metacognition is associated with difficulties in the daily functioning
of people with psychosis. Metacognition can be divided into four domains: Self-Reflection,
Understanding the Other’s Mind, Decentration, and Mastery. This study investigated whether
Metacognitive Reflection and Insight Therapy (MERIT) can be used to improve
metacognition.
Methods. This study is a randomized controlled trial. Patients in the active condition (n = 35)
received forty MERIT sessions, the control group (n = 35) received treatment as usual.
Multilevel intention-to-treat and completers analyses were performed for metacognition
and secondary outcomes (psychotic symptomatology, cognitive insight, Theory of Mind,
empathy, depression, self-stigma, quality of life, social functioning, and work readiness).
Results. Eighteen out of 35 participants finished treatment, half the drop-out stemmed from
therapist attrition (N = 5) or before the first session (N = 4). Intention-to-treat analysis
demonstrated that in both groups metacognition improved between pre- and post-measure-
ments, with no significant differences between the groups. Patients who received MERIT
continued to improve, while the control group returned to baseline, leading to significant
differences at follow-up. Completers analysis (18/35) showed improvements on the
Metacognition Assessment Scale (MAS-A) scales Self Reflectivity and metacognitive
Mastery at follow-up. No effects were found on secondary outcomes.
Conclusions. On average, participants in the MERIT group were, based on MAS-A scores, at
follow-up more likely to recognize their thoughts as changeable rather than as facts. MERIT
might be useful for patients whose self-reflection is too limited to benefit from other therapies.
Given how no changes were found in secondary measures, further research is needed.
Limitations and suggestions for future research are discussed.
Introduction
Many persons with schizophrenia have impaired metacognitive capacity; i.e. a limited ability
to reflect on thoughts and feelings and to integrate these reflections into detailed representa-
tions of oneself and others (Frith, 1992; Lysaker et al. 2011c, 2014; Hamm et al. 2012).
Metacognition can be divided into four semi-independent domains: Self-Reflectivity,
Understanding the Other’s Mind, Decentration – the ability to understand that one is not
at the center of all meaningful activity, and Mastery – the ability to use metacognitive infor-
mation to deal with stressors (Semerari et al. 2003; Lysaker et al. 2011a).
Metacognitive dysfunction is associated with problems in daily life functioning of people
with schizophrenia in several ways. Lower levels of metacognition have been correlated with
lower levels of functional competence (Lysaker et al. 2011b), less subjectively experienced
recovery (Kukla et al. 2013), more severe negative symptoms (Lysaker et al. 2005a; Hamm
et al. 2012; Nicolò et al. 2012; Macbeth et al. 2014), and lower quality of the therapeutic
alliance between patient and therapist (Davis et al. 2011). Further; social cognition and
insight have been positively associated with metacognitive mastery (Lysaker et al. 2011a).
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Furthermore, metacognition has been found to mediate the
impact of neurocognitive deficits on social function, even after
controlling for symptoms (Lysaker et al. 2010b).
Several forms of individual therapy have successfully improved
metacognition in patients with various mental disorders other
than psychosis (Fonagy et al. 2002; Dimaggio et al. 2007;
Choi-Kain & Gunderson, 2008). Lysaker et al. (2011d) proposed
a manualized procedure to improve metacognition in people
with schizophrenia, which is based on eight processes which the
therapist attempts to introduce each session: (1) paying attention
to the client’s agenda as the focus of the session, (2) sharing the
therapist’s thoughts with the client, (3) eliciting a narrative to
serve as a basis for metacognitive reflection, (4) naming and
defining a psychological problem, (5) discussing the interpersonal
processes that occur during the session, and (6) evaluating pro-
gress during the session. These first six elements then serve as a
basis to stimulate self-reflectivity and thought about others (7)
as well as metacognitive mastery (8) by offering reflections or ask-
ing questions at the metacognitive level the client is currently
functioning on. To illustrate, if a participant is discussing how
noisy the grocery store was, a therapist could offer the reflection:
‘You couldn’t think with all that noise’ to a client who is strug-
gling to identify his thoughts as his own, or: ‘You felt scared or
overwhelmed?’ for a participant who is working on the recogni-
tion of emotions. In many ways, Metacognitive Reflection and
Insight Therapy (MERIT) is similar to mentalization-based ther-
apy (Bateman et al. 2009); the primary difference is that MERIT
does not stem from a psychodynamic framework.
Several case studies (Buck & Lysaker, 2009; Lysaker et al. 2009,
2005b, 2007; Bargenquast et al. 2015; Hillis et al. 2015; Buck &
George, 2016; de Jong et al. 2016b; Dubreucq et al. 2016; Hamm
& Firmin, 2016; Leonhardt et al. 2016a; van Donkersgoed et al.
2016) and two pilot studies (Bargenquast & Schweitzer, 2014; de
Jong et al. 2016a) have reported improvement of metacognition
after individual therapy in people with psychosis.
The current paper presents the results of the first randomized
controlled trial investigating the effectiveness of MERIT. The proto-
col was previously described (van Donkersgoed et al. 2014) and
developed after conducting a pilot study (de Jong et al. 2016a).
Based on the pilot studies and case studies mentioned above,
we expected that participants would gain improvements in meta-
cognition as measured by the Metacognition Assessment Scale - A
(MAS-A). As a primary outcome, we expected to see these
improvements on metacognitive Self-Reflectivity and Mastery, as
these have been shown to improve before gains are observed in
Understanding the Other’s Mind and Decentration. A similar pat-
tern to case studies in psychosis (e.g. Lysaker et al. 2007) has been
found in patients suffering from Major Depressive Disorder,
where gains on self-reflectivity precede changes in understanding
others (Ladegaard et al. 2016), implying this to perhaps be the
natural pattern of growth of these abilities. However, given the
length of therapy (40 sessions) we certainly considered improve-
ments on those two scales to be possible as well.
Based on known correlations between scores on metacognition
and outcome measures, a test-battery was constructed to measure
whether changes in metacognition would also, as secondary out-
comes, improve scores on measures of psychotic symptomatology,
cognitive insight, Theory of Mind, depression, self-stigma, quality
of life, social functioning, and work readiness. Finally, we included
two self-report questionnaires to measure empathy [Interpersonal
Reactivity Index (IRI) and Questionnaire of Cognitive and
Affective Empathy (QCAE)] as well as an Empathic Accuracy
Task (EAT; aan het Rot & Hogenelst, 2014). As it is debatable
whether self-report questionnaires can fully capture the dynamic
process of real-life empathy (Ickes, 1997), the EAT was included
to account for this problem. This computer task measures
empathy by asking participants to continually judge the emotions
experienced by another person who is recounting autobio-
graphical events on video. Previous studies have shown that
patients with schizophrenia perform relatively poorly on the
EAT compared with controls (Lee et al. 2011).
Several short measures of neurocognition were also adminis-
tered, to control for the possible influence of neurocognitive def-
icits, in our statistical analyses. Our main hypothesis was that we
would observe improvements on metacognition (particularly
Self-Reflectivity and Mastery).
Methods
The protocol for this study was registered (ISRCTN16659871)
and published (van Donkersgoed et al. 2014) and approved
by the Medical-Ethics Committee of the University Medical
Centre Groningen (METc2013.124). All research was conducted
in accordance to the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki.
The study is a multicenter randomized controlled trial with a
treatment condition in which participants received MERIT and a
control condition in which participants received treatment as
usual (TAU). Patients in the control group and in the MERIT
group met once a month on average with their psychiatrist for
medication monitoring and received practical guidance (for
example with finances or work-related problems) from a social
worker. Two out of 35 participants in the control group met
with a psychologist during the period between pre and post mea-
surements. Four participants met with a psychologist in the period
between the post and follow-up measurements. Patients in the
treatment group did not receive any additional psychosocial inter-
ventions apart from the MERIT therapy. Participants and their
psychiatrists were asked to keep medication changes limited to
only crucial adjustments until study end. Data were collected at
baseline (T0), post-treatment (T1) and after 6 months at follow-up
(T2). Participants received €20 for each completed assessment.
Therapy
MERIT aims to stimulate the four elements of metacognition:
Self-Reflectivity, Understanding the Other’s Mind, Decentration,
and Mastery (Lysaker & Dimaggio, 2014). The treatment protocol
is not a step-by-step program but is guided by the level of meta-
cognition demonstrated by the patient during the session. The
therapist elicits a personal story of the patient. In this narrative,
the therapist looks for signs of metacognition. Is the patient
aware of his/her thoughts? Can she/he reflect on those thoughts
and on the thoughts of others? Does she/he identify and frame
psychological distress? The scales of the MAS-A (see materials)
are used to classify the level of metacognitive functioning. The
therapist adjusts his or her interventions according to the level
of metacognition of the patient and stimulates the patient to per-
form more complex metacognitive tasks, using eight specific treat-
ment elements (T-MAS, see Appendix A). The therapy consists of
forty individual therapy sessions. The treatment protocol was
translated into Dutch by the research team.
Treatment as usual (TAU) consisted of the continuation of anti-
psychotic medication from a multidisciplinary team and according
to Dutch guidelines. Where a different therapy (such as cognitive
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behavioral therapy) was already underway, that course of treatment
was continued until the end. Support staff was asked not to begin
any new interventions for 40 weeks. This design closely mimics the
treatment reality in the Netherlands: despite Cognitive Behavioral
Therapy (CBT) being a guideline treatment in the Netherlands,
unfortunately, far from every patient has access to this (or other
psychosocial) intervention.
Therapists
Thirteen therapists across seven mental healthcare institutes in
the Netherlands were recruited. All therapists had at least a master
degree in Clinical Psychology and practical experience in the field,
and 85% held the post-master health-care-license required for clin-
ical practice in the Netherlands. Therapists received a 3-day train-
ing program in MERIT, delivered by its first author, P.H. Lysaker.
Once every 2 weeks a group supervision session by Lysaker was
organized for all therapists via internet telephony, in which the
therapists received feedback on how they applied the method.
Participants
Patients in the participating treatment facilities were screened on
metacognitive difficulties using four screening questions, devel-
oped based on the four domains of metacognition mentioned
above (e.g. ‘To what extent is the patient able to think about
his/her own thoughts?’). Answers were given on a Likert scale
0–10, with a higher score reflecting a higher estimate of metacog-
nitive functioning. These questions were completed by the case
manager or by the staff member most familiar with the patient.
Intended only as the first, coarse screening of caseloads, these
questions were kept simple so as to ensure no training of case
managers would be required. Patients who scored <6 on two or
more of the screening questions were subsequently approached
in person and received basic information and an information let-
ter regarding the study.
Inclusion criteria
• Impaired metacognitive abilities (determined using the MAS-A,
see instruments),
• Diagnosis of Schizophrenia or Schizoaffective Disorder according
to DSM-IV-TR [Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview
(MINI)-PLUS],
• Being able to give informed consent,
• 18 years or older,
• No change in medication in the 30 days before the first
assessment.
Exclusion criteria
• Acute psychosis at the moment of assessment [Positive and
Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) positive symptoms >4],
• Co-morbid neurological disorder in the patient file,
• Diagnosis of severe substance dependence, but not abuse,
• Impaired intellectual functioning (IQ < 70) (patient file).
Interested participants were administered a baseline assessment
composed of two meetings with a research assistant. In the first
meeting, the inclusion and exclusion criteria were verified with
the MINI-Plus, Indiana Psychiatric Illness Interview (IPII),
MAS-A, and PANSS interview (for materials see below). After
inclusion, participants were administered the remainder of the
test battery in a second meeting. To ensure blind randomization,
an independent third party performed block randomization pro-
cedures (Kazdin, 2010) to ensure groups equivalent in size. See
Fig. 1 for a CONSORT diagram detailing participant flow.
Assessment
All research assistants held at least a bachelor’s degree in psych-
ology were enrolled in a master’s program in clinical psychology
and were blinded to participant condition. Assessment occurred
at three moments: T0 (baseline), T1 (directly following treat-
ment), and T2 (6-month follow-up).
Primary outcome: metacognition
Metacognition Assessment Scale-A (MAS-A; Lysaker et al. 2005a).
To assess metacognitive functioning, the Indiana Psychiatric
Illness Interview (see below) was conducted and transcribed.
Three raters blind to condition and trained in the MAS-A during
a 4-h training, scored this transcript on metacognitive capacity
along four axes: Self-Reflectivity [scores 0 (low) – 9 (high)],
Understanding the Other’s Mind [scores 0 (low) −7 (high)],
Decentration [scores 0 (low)− 3 (high)], and Mastery [scores 0
(low) − 9 (high)]. During consensus meetings, final scores on
each of the four domains were established. Total scores are ana-
lyzed, followed by analyses to determine on which specific
domains improvements were found.
Indiana Psychiatric Illness Interview (Lysaker et al. 2005a). The
IPII is a semi-structured interview developed to elicit a speech sam-
ple during which participants can demonstrate metacognitive cap-
acity. Interviews last between 20 and 60 min, and consist of five
sections: life narrative, illness narrative, experience of mental illness,
the influence of illness on one’s life, and the future. The interview is
converted into a transcript, which is used to score the level of meta-
cognition of the participant using the MAS-A (see above).
Secondary outcomes
Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS; Beck et al. 2004). This 15-item
questionnaire measures cognitive insight along the subscales of
self-reflectiveness (nine items) and certainty (six items) using a
four-point Likert scale. A total score is obtained by subtracting
the Self Certainty score from the Self-Reflectiveness score, result-
ing in an Index of cognitive insight (with higher scores indicating
better insight), which has demonstrated promising psychometric
qualities, including convergent and criterion validity (Riggs
et al. 2012).
Clinical Global Impression (CGI; Haro et al. 2003). This rating
scale allows for the assessment of the participant’s current func-
tioning, along with the domains of positive symptoms, negative
symptoms and general symptoms using 7 anchor points per
scale, ranging from ‘Not ill’ to ‘Among the most severely ill’.
Empathic Accuracy Task (aan het Rot & Hogenelst, 2014). To
measure empathic accuracy we used a Dutch language task. A
shorter version was used, this was necessary to keep the total
assessment battery under 2 h. The original task was shortened
by selecting four out of the ten original videos. Participants
were required to continuously rate the valence (positive–negative)
of the videos in which a target tells a personal story, using a dial.
Scores of the participants are correlated with the target’s own rat-
ings (provided during task development), leading to an index of
empathic accuracy. Level of expressivity of the targets is
based on their score on the Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire
(BEQ; Gross & John, 1995). Correlations underwent a Fisher
z-transformation for statistical purposes.
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Faux-Pas Test (FPT; Baron-Cohen et al. 1999). During this test
of Theory of Mind, ten stories are read aloud to the participant, who
can read along using a printed-out version of the story. The partici-
pant is asked whether a socially undesirable action was taken by one
of the participants, or not, and how the participant in the story must
have felt, resulting in 2 scores: the number of faux pas correctly
identified (min 0–max. 5) and empathy questions (‘How does per-
son X in the story feel’) answered correctly (min 0–max. 5).
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983). Using 28
items to be answered on a six-point Likert scale, this question-
naire measures subjective empathy, with a higher score indicating
greater self-reported empathy.
Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness Scale (ISMIS; Boyd
Ritsher et al. 2003). The ISMIS measures self-reported internalized
stigma of mental illness using 29-items on a four-point Likert scale.
Higher scores are indicative of a greater experience of self-stigma.
Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan
et al. 1998). This well-validated structured interview is designed
to measure the presence of neuropsychiatric disorders. Sections
A through D (mood disorders), K through L (substance abuse),
and M (psychotic disorders) were administered to verify in-
and exclusion criteria for the study.
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay et al.
1987). This semi-structured interview was employed by trained
raters to indicate the severity of 30 symptoms of psychosis on
three scales: positive symptoms (e.g. hallucinations, delusions),
negative symptoms (e.g. blunted affect, emotional withdrawal)
and general psychopathology (e.g. anxiety, depression) using a
Fig. 1. CONSORT diagram of participant flow.
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seven-point Likert scale, ranging from ‘Absent’ to ‘Extreme’,
resulting in a total score between 30 and 210, with higher scores
indicating more severe symptomatology.
Personal and Social Performance Scale (PSP; Nasrallah et al.
2008). Using this rating scale, interviewers rate the impact of
the disorder on four domains of social functioning on a six-point
Likert scale ranging from ‘absent’ to ‘very severe’. Results are con-
verted in a 1–100 score of severity, with higher scores indicating
the more severe impact of the disorder on functioning.
Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE;
Reniers et al. 2011). Based on factor analysis of several common
self-report measures (including the IRI), the QCAE measures
self-reported empathy. It consists of 31 items, answered on a
four-point Likert scale, with higher scores indicating greater self-
reported empathy.
Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology-Self Report
(QIDS-SR; Rush et al. 2003). The QIDS-SR measures depressive
symptoms during the last week, using 16-items based on the
DSM-IV-TR criteria for Major Depressive Disorder, answered
on a four-point Likert scale. A higher total score indicates greater
severity of depressive symptoms.
Self-Rated Manchester Short Assessment of Quality of Life
(MANSA; Priebe et al. 1999). Using 12 subjective and four
objective questions answered on a seven-point Likert scale, this
questionnaire allows the participant to indicate general life satis-
faction along several domains, with higher scores indicating
greater satisfaction.
Work Readiness Questionnaire (WorQ; Potkin et al. 2012).
Using this rating scale, interviewers can indicate the patient’s
readiness to work on seven items, followed by an eighth dichot-
omous work readiness judgment. Only the sum score of the
seven non-dichotomous items are used in analyses.
Cognition measures
Dutch Adult Reading Test (DART; Schmand et al. 1991). The
DART tests the pronunciation of irregularly spelled words and
is used to estimate premorbid intelligence.
Trailmaking test A&B (TMT; Reitan & Wolfson, 1985). The
TMT provides information on the visual search, scanning, mental
flexibility speed of processing and executive functions. It is part of
the Halstead–Reitan battery. The TMT consists of two parts. Part
A requires an individual to draw lines sequentially connecting 25
encircled numbers distributed on a sheet of paper. Task require-
ments are similar for part B except the person must alternate
between numbers and letters (e.g. 1, A, 2, B, 3, C, etc.). The
final score is determined by subtracting the time to complete
task A from the time it took to complete task B, with higher
scores indicating poorer neurocognition (Tombaugh, 2004).
Digit Symbol Test (part of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale; Wechsler, 1995). This test evaluates the recognition and
recoding of visual information, resulting in a score of information
processing speed (McGurk & Mueser, 2006). The test consists of
several rows of paired boxes with a digit in the top box and an
empty space in the box below. At the top of the page is shown
which symbols are paired to the digits. The participant has to
fill in as many symbols in the empty boxes within 90 s. The
final score consists of the amount of symbols that is filled in cor-
rectly within the time, with a higher score indicating better
cognition.
Most measures demonstrated good internal consistency, with
Cronbach’s alphas at baseline: ISMI (0.90), PANSS (0.87),
QCAE (0.84), PSP (0.74), MANSA (0.74), QIDS-SR (0.73),
WorQ (0.78), CGI (0.73). Internal consistency for the MAS-A
was questionable (0.63), and IRI subscales ranged from question-
able to fair (PT 0.61; FS 0.70; EC 0.67; PD 0.74). The BCIS ranged
from poor (0.54, Self-Certainty) to questionable (0.65, Self-
Reflectiveness). Post-therapy, the MAS-A demonstrated good
internal consistency (0.77) and the IRI subscales ranged from ques-
tionable to good (PT 0.69; FS 0.76; EC; 0.60; PD 0.84). The BCIS
subscales ranged from poor (0.54, Self-Certainty) to questionable
(0.67, Self-Reflectiveness).
Statistical analyses
Demographic differences between groups were tested using SPSS
Statistics 24 with independent-samples t tests (age, age at onset of
first psychosis, number of psychotic episodes, duration of illness,
estimated premorbid IQ, cognition, and symptoms) or Pearson’s
chi-square (χ2) test (gender, diagnosis, education level). These
were conducted two-tailed, with significance level set at α = 0.05.
The effects of the treatment on outcome measures were
assessed with multilevel analysis, using MLWiN (Charlton et al.
2017). A separate three-level model was constructed for each of
the outcome variables: Therapists were modeled at level 3, parti-
cipants at level 2, and time of assessment at level 1. The following
predictors were entered as fixed effects: (a) dummy variables
representing time (T0, T1, T2); and (b) the interactions
T1*condition and T2*condition. The random effects were the
intercepts at levels 2 and 3, and residual at level 1. To assess
whether the MERIT group had improved more than the control
group at T1 and T2, significance testing was conducted using
deviance tests (e.g. Snijders & Bosker, 2000) between the models
with the interaction between the time of assessment under inves-
tigation (T1 or T2) and condition (MERIT/TAU), and a model
without the interaction terms, with significance level set at α =
0.05. The deviance test is based on the difference between the
deviance statistics (defined as −2 ln likelihood function value)
of two nested models, which has a χ2 distribution with degrees
of freedom equal to the difference in the number of parameters
estimated in the models being compared. An intention-to-treat
analysis was conducted on the entire sample, followed by a com-
pleters analysis in which only the results were modeled of those
participants who had completed the therapy.
Results
Demographics
In total, 70 participants were included in the study (Fig. 1), dis-
tributed evenly among the two conditions. None of the demo-
graphic variables differed significantly between the groups
(Table 1). As reported in Table 1, none of the demographic vari-
ables demonstrated statistically significant differences between
the groups, and as such none were entered into subsequent ana-
lyses. Antipsychotic medication changes between pre- and post-
measures as reported by the patient indicate no differences
between the groups: in both groups, one participant quit anti-
psychotic medication with permission from the psychiatrist. In
the control condition, five patients reduced their antipsychotic
medication with any amount, two in the MERIT condition. In
both conditions, one participant received an increase in anti-
psychotic medication. In the control condition, one participant
quit antipsychotic medication without permission from the
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psychiatrist. No change in medication was observed in 27/35
(77%) in control, 31/35 (89%) in MERIT.
Drop-out
Participants were invited for post-measurement and follow-up
assessments irrespective of completing all forty sessions of ther-
apy or not. Drop-out in the control condition, as defined by a
refusal to take part in the post-measurement and/or follow-up
measurement, was 9/35, compared with 11/35 in the MERIT con-
dition for post-treatment, and 12/35 compared with 22/35 in the
MERIT condition for follow-up.
Therapy completion
The study had a relatively high attrition rate of 51% (17/35).
However, four participants dropped out before receiving even the
first session of therapy, and another five participants did not com-
plete therapy due to therapist attrition (e.g. maternity leave). As
such, only eight out of 35 participants (23%) possibly dropped out
of the study due to the method under investigation, although none
of the participants themselves reported this as the reason for drop-
ping out. No significant differences between drop-out and comple-
ters were found on either primary measures or secondary measures.
Primary outcome
Intention-to-treat analysis (Table 2) revealed that in both groups
metacognition total scores had improved from baseline to post-
treatment. Directly after treatment, differences in growth of meta-
cognition were non-significant between the two groups, with the
deviance test between a model with and a model without the
time (pre-post)*condition (MERIT–TAU) interaction yielding χ2
(1) = 0.435, p = 0.51. While the total metacognition scores in the
control condition dipped back down between post-treatment and
6-month follow-up, the MERIT group continued to improve. At
follow-up, differences between the two groups were significant for
the MAS-A total score. The addition of the interaction term of
time (follow-up)*condition (MERIT/TAU) led to a significant
improvement of the model, with deviance tests yielding χ2 (1) =
3.763, p = 0.05. Analyses using the MAS-A subscales as outcome
revealed that gains were only significant on the subscale self-
reflectivity, with the deviance test yielding χ2 (1) = 10.295, p = 0.001.
Completers analyses (Table 3) support the findings. When
only taking into account those who had completed all 40 sessions
of the therapy, differences between the groups in improvements
on Metacognitive Self-Reflectivity (MAS-A) were significant at
post-measurement, with the deviance test between a model with
and a model without the time (pre-post)*condition (MERIT–
TAU) interaction yielding χ2 (1) = 4.219, p = 0.04. At follow-up,
differences between groups were significant for the MAS Total
score, as the addition of the interaction term of time (follow-
up)*condition (MERIT–TAU) led to a significant improvement
of the model, with the deviance test yielding χ2 (1) = 8.182, p =
0.004. Analyses using the subscales of the MAS-A indicated that
scores on self-reflectivity χ2 (1) = 12.784, p < 0.01 and Mastery
χ2 (1) = 4.793, p = 0.02 had improved at follow-up more for the
MERIT group than the TAU group.
Secondary outcomes
No sustaining significant differences were found on the second-
ary outcome measures. In the MERIT condition, at post-
measurement, symptoms significantly increased, with deviance
Table 1. Comparison of demographic variables between the control and MERIT conditions
Variable Control N MERIT N p t Test/χ2
Age in years, mean (S.D.) 38 (10.61) 35 42 (12.02) 35 0.14
Gender 35 35 0.43
Male, # 26 23
Female, # 9 12




Diagnosis 35 35 0.80
Schizophrenia, # 23 24
Schizoaffective, # 12 11
Age of onset in years, mean (S.D.) 23.18 (6.26) 34 25.97 (9.31) 33 0.15
# of episodes, mean (S.D.) 2.83 (3.04) 30 3.16 (3.07) 31 0.68
Years of illness, mean (S.D.) 12 (9.54) 31 15.53 (11.47) 31 0.19
DART*, mean (S.D.) 77.94 (14.01) 34 78.5 (13.32) 32 0.87
Trailmaking, mean (S.D.) 174.38 (88.88) 34 156.29 (66.19) 35 0.34
Digit Symbol, mean (S.D.) 52.53 (17.51) 34 52.17 (18.28) 35 0.93
PANSS* total, mean (S.D.) 66.29 (17.87) 34 66.17 (15.02) 35 0.98
*DART, Dutch Adult Reading Test; PANSS, Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale.
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tests yielding χ2 (1) = 4.278, p = 0.04, but returned to baseline at
follow-up, χ2 (1) = 0.025, p = 0.87. Tables presenting these results
are included as supplemental materials (online Supplementary
Tables S4 and S5).
Therapist effect
Multilevel analysis did not reveal a significant contribution of the
therapist variable as a level to the model, indicating no significant
differences between therapists regarding the improvement of
metacognition.
Discussion
The current multicenter randomized controlled trial investigated
the effectivity of MERIT in improving metacognition. Intention-
to-treat analyses indicated an improvement in metacognition in
both groups, with no significant differences between groups dir-
ectly post-treatment. Differences between the groups did become
evident at follow-up; however, with the MERIT group demonstrat-
ing a continued improvement on Metacognitive Self-Reflectivity,
whereas the control condition dipped back down. Completers ana-
lyses, which only included the patients that finished the therapy,
demonstrated significant differences on self-reflection between
Table 2. Fixed and random effects on the subscales of the Metacognition Assessment Scale – intention to treat
Self Other Decentr. Mastery MAS-Total
Parameter Beta (S.E.) Beta (S.E.) Beta (S.E.) Beta (S.E.) Beta (S.E.)
Fixed effects
Time factor
Baseline 4.23 (0.19) 2.60 (0.10) 1.04 (0.07) 3.18 (0.20) 11.11 (0.50)
Post effecta 0.15 (0.23) 0.02 (0.16) 0.06 (0.11) 0.83 (0.24) 1.08 (0.56)
Post effect MERITa 0.42 (0.30) 0.30 (0.22) 0.08 (0.15) −0.04 (0.33) 0.76 (0.75)
Follow-up effectb −0.06 (0.24) −0.04 (0.17) 0.16 (0.12) 0.83 (0.26) 0.92 (0.59)
Follow-up MERITb 1.22** (0.37) 0.31 (0.26) −0.05 (0.18) 0.36 (0.37) 1.81* (0.91)
Random effects
Variances of
Level 3 – therapist 0.19 (0.14) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.16 (0.16) 1.40 (1.05)
Level 2 – intercept 0.35 (0.15) 0.22 (0.08) 0.10 (0.04) 0.66 (0.22) 3.10 (1.09)
Level 1 – residual 0.87 (0.13) 0.44 (0.07) 0.21 (0.03) 0.94 (0.14) 5.10 (0.77)
** = significant at p < 0.01, one-tailed.
* = significant at p < 0.05, one-tailed.
aPost effect: difference between T0 and T1 (TAU is reference category).
bFollow-up effect: difference between T0 and T2 (TAU is reference category).
Table 3. Fixed and random effects on the subscales of the Metacognition Assessment Scale – sensitivity analysis
Self Other Decentr. Mastery MAS-Total
Parameter Beta (S.E.) Beta (S.E.) Beta (S.E.) Beta (S.E.) Beta (S.E.)
Fixed effects
Time factor
Baseline 4.04 (0.22) 2.61 (0.14) 1.06 (0.09) 3.35 (0.20) 11.07 (0.56)
Post effecta 0.26 (0.23) 0.00 (0.18) 0.05 (0.11) 0.73 (0.23) 1.05 (0.57)
Post effect MERITa 0.67* (0.32) 0.35 (0.25) 0.23 (0.15) 0.11 (0.33) 1.31 (0.79)
Follow-up effectb 0.06 (0.25) −0.04 (0.19) 0.17 (0.12) 0.72 (0.25) 0.92 (0.61)
Follow-up MERITb 1.42*** (0.38) 0.49 (0.29) 0.08 (0.18) 0.87* (0.39) 2.81** (0.95)
Random effects
Variances of
Level 3 – therapist 0.24 (0.18) 0.03 (0.06) 0.02 (0.03) 0.10 (0.15) 1.49 (1.23)
Level 2 – intercept 0.28 (0.15) 0.24 (0.10) 0.09 (0.04) 0.55 (0.21) 2.85 (1.18)
Level 1 – residual 0.84 (0.14) 0.48 (0.08) 0.19 (0.03) 0.81 (0.13) 4.83 (0.78)
*** = significant at p < 0.001, one-tailed.
** = significant at p < 0.01, one-tailed.
* = significant at p < 0.05, one-tailed.
aPost effect: difference between T0 and T1 (TAU is reference category).
bFollow-up effect: difference between T0 and T2 (TAU is reference category).
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groups already at post-treatment, with better scores in the treat-
ment condition.
Self-Reflectivity is an important element of metacognition as it
is correlated with daily life factors such as a subjective sense of
recovery (Kukla et al. 2013) and work performance (Lysaker
et al. 2010a). Group averages indicate that patients at baseline
were able to recognize and distinguish between their different
thoughts and emotions, but did not perceive their thoughts are
subjective and changeable. In other words: thoughts were
accepted as facts. After MERIT, group average scores indicated
having moved past being able to recognize that the ideas about
oneself and the world are subjective and changeable. This is par-
ticularly relevant in light of CBT, a widely used treatment in peo-
ple with a psychotic disorder, which focuses on the modification
of maladaptive cognitions (Wykes et al. 2008). Some patients may
not have the necessary level of self-reflection to be able to engage
in CBT techniques. Challenging or changing your thoughts is dif-
ficult when you are not aware of them or when you are not aware
that they can change over time. MERIT may be useful for patients
that do not respond (well) to CBT. It can serve as a way to
improve self-reflection after which the patient might be able to
benefit from CBT methods. Future studies are needed to verify
this hypothesis.
Completers analyses, which only included the patients that fin-
ished the therapy, additionally found significant improvements on
Mastery at 6 months follow-up. At baseline patients’ scores indi-
cated that patients in both conditions on average responded to
psychological challenges through gross avoidance and passive
activities, such as following other’s directions. At follow-up, in
the MERIT condition, patients’ scores indicated that 9/11 (82%)
of participants who completed therapy were able to respond to
psychological challenges by actively choosing and engaging in
specific activities and behaviors such as medication use, or seeking
therapeutic interventions, compared with 2/18 (11%) at baseline. In
the control condition, some participants had also improved to this
level (from 3/27 = 11% at baseline to 8/22 = 36% at follow-up), but
most only reached a level where avoidance behaviors were either
more specific (i.e. avoiding supermarkets instead of staying indoors
completely) or seeking social support, 4/22 = 18%). Again it must
be noted that this represents the average group score. There was
considerable variance between participants, some patients in the
MERIT group still were not able to actively choose solutions for
their psychological problems after therapy, whereas others were
not only able to change their thoughts to deal with problems but
were also able to use knowledge about their own and others cogni-
tions and emotions to come to solutions. General group scores may
suggest that MERIT empowered patients to face their challenges in
a more active manner, which may make them less dependent on
people around them and may allow them to take a more active
role in their treatment.
Difference between conditions only became evident at
follow-up in the intention-to-treat analyses. One explanation for
this effect is that metacognitive gains take some time to develop,
even after therapy has been concluded. Such findings are not
uncommon; a meta-analysis of cognitive therapy (Gould et al.
2001) has shown continued improvements after therapy was con-
cluded. Improvements in the control condition are not likely to be
caused by psychological interventions in this group, as at post-
assessment two out of 35 patients in the control condition indi-
cated having had any contact with a psychologist. Between
post- and follow-up, this number increased to four. It is therefore
unlikely that interventions in the control group had significant
effects on our findings. Possibly, the finding of the control group’s
raised performance at post measurement reflects a natural fluctu-
ation in metacognitive capacity.
Understanding the Other’s Mind and Decentration, two other
components of metacognition, appeared less sensitive to change,
as no significant effects on these scales were found. This is con-
sistent with results from our pilot study (de Jong et al. 2016a)
and from long-term case studies in psychosis (Lysaker et al.
2007) and major depressive disorder (Ladegaard et al. 2016). It
is possible that it is necessary to be able to think about your
own thoughts and feelings before you can understand and think
about what is occurring in the others mind (Dimaggio et al.
2008). Meta-analyses of fMRI findings support this, having
found that perception of the self and others share higher order
neural pathways in which these processes are combined (van
der Meer et al. 2010; van Veluw & Chance, 2014). From a clinical
perspective, it seems logical that Self-Reflection has to improve
before someone can start to reflect on the mind of others.
When someone is not aware of his own thoughts and feelings,
how can he understand those of others? One long-term case
study has found the first improvements to Understanding the
Other’s Mind to occur after about 16 months (Lysaker et al.
2007). In designing future studies, it would be recommended to
consider the possibility of more than 40 sessions.
A significant increase of symptoms between baseline and post
measurement was found in the MERIT group. This difference was
no longer present at follow-up. This is likely not due to drop-out
at follow-up, as no significant differences were found on post
treatment symptoms between follow-up drop-outs and follow-up
completers. It is possible that increased self-reflectivity at post-
measurement allowed participants to report more symptomatol-
ogy (thus reflecting greater insight into illness), although the
inverse is just as likely: increased symptoms at post-treatment
may have obfuscated metacognitive gains. Alternatively, perhaps
medications were suboptimal, or the (metacognitive) demands
put on patients during an intensive course of psychotherapy
may elicit symptomatology to increase. One qualitative study
into precursors of psychotic content in 48 therapy sessions
revealed that particular themes of conversation could be identified
before psychotic content emerged (Leonhardt et al. 2016b) which
were all related to some form of metacognitive strain. Firm con-
clusions are precluded given the lack of significant changes on
measures of cognitive insight or illness insight in the current
study. Future should studies address this question. Particularly
in the context of a recent intersubjective model of psychotherapy
in psychotic disorders, any links between metacognition, insight
into illness and the therapeutic relationship could prove highly
informative (Hasson-Ohayon et al. 2017).
No other significant group differences on secondary outcomes
were found. This is puzzling, as scores of metacognition on the
MAS-A have frequently shown to be correlated to functioning
on, for instance, depression (Lysaker et al. 2013). The Beck
Cognitive Insight Scale, on which no significant changes were
observed as a result of therapy, is sometimes even labeled as meas-
uring metacognition (Lysaker et al. 2011c). Similarly, while meta-
cognitive mastery improved, other measures which are related to
functioning (such as the Personal and Social Performance scale)
showed no significant improvement. We see three possible expla-
nations for this contradiction. First, prior work has generally been
correlational, and that the causal relationship may be inverse
(with, for instance, depression influencing metacognition rather
than vice versa). It is also possible that an improvement in
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metacognition has no effect on the other variables. However, as
multiple studies have shown relationships between metacognition
and our secondary outcomes (e.g. Lysaker et al. 2010b; Hamm
et al. 2012; Macbeth et al. 2014), including self-reflectivity specif-
ically (Nicolò et al. 2012), another explanation may entail that
more time needs to pass for improved metacognition to positively
impact secondary outcomes. For example, it may take a while for
someone with improved self-reflection to slowly adjust stigmatic
views of oneself to a less stigmatic one. It also may take a while
for someone with improved Mastery to find a better job or get
to know more friends. Another viable explanation is that our sam-
ple had demonstrated impaired metacognitive capacity but had
relatively modest scores of, for instance, symptomatology, and
as such there was little room for improvement. Some participants
dropped out of MERIT on the argument of ‘too busy with work’
(n = 4) or ‘doing too well’ (n = 3). While we find this encouraging,
we are hesitant to count this as therapy success, as no other mea-
sures of functioning indicated improvements and we cannot rule
out that participants supplied this reason out of social desirability.
Only about half of patients completed all forty sessions of
MERIT. No significant differences on the four scales of metacog-
nition were found between the drop-out group and the group that
completed the therapy. The long duration of the therapy played a
role particularly in study attrition, with several therapists finding
other work or going on maternity leave, causing attrition of five
participants. Four more participants dropped out before receiving
even a single session of therapy. Eight participants actually dropped
out from the study during therapy, giving reasons such as ‘no con-
nection with the therapist’ and being too busy with work. As such,
it is possible that the therapy was not acceptable to them (23%).
In post-treatment interviews conducted with the patients who
completed the therapy, all respondents indicated that they had
found the therapy useful (‘My wife also noticed I was doing bet-
ter’, ‘More good things about yourself come to the surface. It is
not just your bad sides. I learned to see myself more positively’),
and would recommend it to others. The only negative effect men-
tioned was the intensive nature of the therapy (‘After sessions, I
often needed rest’), by two out of fifteen participants (13%). As
no significant contribution of the therapist variable as a level in
the multilevel model was found, improvement of metacognition
does not seem to depend on specific therapist characteristics.
Our study has several limitations. We investigated the effect of
precisely 40 sessions of psychotherapy. A psychosocial interven-
tion such as the one used in this study may not lend itself well
for studies with a fixed amount of sessions. Namely, several of
our participants indicated their motivation for drop-out as ‘doing
too well’, an observation supported by their therapist. In a clinical
setting, ending therapy this way is obviously appropriate and may
improve results. Future studies could account for this issue by set-
ting a minimum and maximum amount of sessions. Furthermore,
while an effect was found, power analysis for our study indicated a
required 120 participants. However, only 70 could be included
(see Fig. 1). Future studies with larger sample sizes should be con-
ducted to support or reject our findings. Additionally, the BCIS
demonstrated very low internal consistency and results on this
measure should be interpreted with caution; future studies may
wish to consider an alternative measure for cognitive insight.
Also, in our use of the MAS-A, we opted to ensure the highest
accuracy of ratings on metacognition by using three-person con-
sensus groups. Future studies should be conducted in which indi-
vidual raters’ scores are obtained and used to serve the additional
benefit of providing a measure of interrater reliability. Finally, the
control condition in the current study received treatment as usual.
Future studies should compare metacognitive therapy with other
active treatments to determine the efficacy of MERIT vis a vis
extant interventions.
Conclusion
MERIT did not improve metacognition immediately post-
treatment. At follow-up, however, self-reflection of participants
was improved significantly more in the MERIT condition than
in the control condition. That is, participants (on average) chan-
ged from seeing their thoughts as facts to recognizing their
thoughts as subjective and changeable. MERIT might, therefore,
be a useful treatment approach for patients whose self-reflection
is too limited to benefit from other therapies such as CBT.
Completers’ analyses also showed improvement of Mastery at
follow-up, suggesting that MERIT may potentially empower
patients to face their challenges in a more active manner, which
will ultimately give them more control over problems in daily
life. These outcomes warrant further research into the efficacy
of the method.
Supplementary material. The supplementary material for this article can
be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291718000855
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Appendix A T-MAS
(1) Openness to the patient’s agenda at the session outset and throughout the
session.
1……2……3……4……5
(2) Offer of the therapist’s thoughts/perceptions regarding the patient’s behav-
ior in the session.
1……2……3……4……5
(3) Details of a narrative episode are elicited.
1……2……3……4……5
(4) A psychological problem or dilemma is framed as something to be discussed
1……2……3……4……5
(5) Reflection on the interpersonal processes during the session is elicited.
1……2……3……4……5
(6) Reflection on progress/ course of the session is elicited at various times
during the session or at session’s end.
1……2……3……4……5
(7) The patient is stimulated to engage in metacognitive acts with interven-
tions that are appropriate to patient’s capacity for self-reflectivity and/or
awareness of the mind of the other.
1……2……3……4……5
(8) The patient is stimulated to engage in metacognitive acts with inter-




Key: 1. absent; 2. intermittant moments in which basic competency is pre-
sent; 3. fully adequate or competent throughout; 4. fully adequate with
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